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Abstract
The online distribution channel expands in many sectors, and the
food industry is not left out. This paper analyzes the impact of e-
commerce on French grocery shopping. Using purchase data, we develop a
structural econometric model of demand and supply to estimate the effect
of the emergence of online distribution channels on prices, profit, consumer
surplus, and profit-sharing between retailers and manufacturers in the soft
drink sector. We find that e-commerce leads to market expansion, and the
effect on the retailers’ profits depends on their online strategy. The retailers
which developed independent warehouses for the online distribution channel
get higher market shares, retail margins, and profits. The retailers which
develop the online services in the existing stores or adjoined warehouses get
lower downstream margins, market shares, and profits with e-commerce.
Our results also suggest that the introduction of the online grocery channel
is profitable to most manufacturers due to an increase in wholesale margins.
This increase with the introduction of e-commerce comes from the higher
retailers’ fear of risking a bargaining breakdown compared to accepting a
concession to its trading partner.
Key words: E-commerce, grocery, online shopping, bargaining, profit sharing
JEL classification: L13, L63, L81
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1 Introduction
Although traditional shopping is not about to disappear, e-commerce has expanded
significantly in recent years, particularly with the covid-19 crisis. The customers want
to save time and money while benefiting from a wide choice of goods, and firms are
interested in wider market penetration. In many sectors, there is already massive use
of e-commerce as a distribution channel. A recent report of Nielsen (2017) indicates
that online sales of consumer products worldwide will exceed store sales within five
years. E-commerce has many different advantages. For customers, e-commerce makes
it possible to make purchases from anywhere and at any time. They are therefore not
limited by the opening hours of a traditional store.
E-commerce has rapidly become a significant component of sales. The offline and
online distribution channels do not seem to be separate markets but are substitutes
(Goolsbee 2001; Prince 2007). Intuitively, one of the main expected benefits of e-
commerce is a price decline (Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Cooper 2006). However, the
introduction of online commerce did not necessarily have a dramatic price decrease
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2000; Clay et al. 2012). The online distribution channel can allow
the consumers to access more varieties thanks to a larger storage capacity. The access to
more varieties thanks to e-commerce has a positive impact on welfare, according to the
literature (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Quan and Kevin 2017). Empirical evidence shows
that e-commerce may have a positive impact on the market expansion (Duch et al.
2017; Biyalogorsky and Naik 2003; Gallino and Moreno 2014). For example, Duch et al.
(2017) find that the online distribution channel’s sales compensated the little reduction
of traditional distribution channel activity. The above studies all focused on non-grocery
markets. However, grocery shopping differs from non-grocery shopping. From a firm
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point of view, the goods’ perishability nature does not allow to centralize operation over
large areas. The potential cost gain is limited. Additionally, the competition in this
market tends to be local. In addition, unlike other markets, there are fewer alternatives
online than offline in the food industry. Thus, conclusions about non-grocery products
might not apply to grocery items. Consumers’ behavior can be different across online
and offline consumers. The marketing literature shows that, on the online grocery
shopping market, online consumers are less price-sensitive than offline consumers (Chu
and Cebollada-Calvo 2008; Degeratu et al. 2000; Andrews and Currim 2004; Chu
et al. 2010). Furthermore, the brand loyalty is higher online than offline (Degeratu
et al. 2000; Danaher et al. 2003; Andrews and Currim 2004; Pozzi 2012). When the
households consume, they have to support some transaction costs as, for instance, the
transportation cost, the costs of inability to verify product quality before buying, or the
physical costs of picking items. Chintagunta et al. (2012) find that transaction costs
can be sizable and played a significant role in the choice between online and offline
channels. However, they find an important household heterogeneity in these costs.
Consuming through the online distribution channel, the consumer avoids storage costs,
picking items, and transportation costs. The share of bulky and promotional items
in the average household’s basket increases once it was possible to shop online (Pozzi
2013b). E-commerce also positively impacts the market expansion for the food industry
(Pozzi 2013a).
The traditional e-commerce with delivery in the food market did not convince many
consumers in Europe except for the United Kingdom. Consumers generally pay the
delivery costs, and only a few consumers are willing to pay for delivery. Nowadays, a
new e-commerce concept, click & drive, has been developed in Europe, particularly in
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France. The consumers buy online and then pick up their order by car in a dedicated
warehouse or on the specially arranged parking of a supermarket. It allows firms or
consumers to avoid delivery costs. The first click & drive store in France was set up
in 2000. Since the last decade, click & drive structures have flourished throughout this
country. In the online distribution channel, the drive represents 81% of the online sales
against 19% for the delivery (Nielsen 2018). Rarely a new mode of distribution will
have had a progression as fast as the drive. According to Nielsen (2016), in 2012 and
2013, 1.9 click & drive opened daily. This pace has slowed down in recent years. In the
first quarter of 2016, 0.8 click & drive opened daily due to potential market saturation.
In 2015, 80% of French households now had access to a click & drive within 15 minutes
of home. It is therefore not surprising that 24% of French households used the drive.
The Nielsen study also reveals that 9% of French households are even convinced by
the drive-by making at least 40% of their purchases in 2015. Among them are mainly
families, in search of practicality and time-saving.
The retailers offer online distribution channels and drive services with two distinct
strategies in the French grocery market. An isolated drive is a place with an autonomous
and remote warehouse, and the adjoined drive is attached to a classic store. This work’s
first objective is to identify the effect of both strategies on prices, profits, and consumer
surplus. The second objective of this work is to analyze the impact of e-commerce on
the vertical relationship. We will identify the effects on manufacturer and retailer profits
and profit-sharing. Using scanner data on the French soft drink market, we develop a
demand and supply model to better understand retailers’ and manufacturers’ consumer
preferences and pricing strategies. We focus on the French soft drink industry, which
is of particular interest, given large food companies operating in a different market
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segment. Furthermore, 21.5% of the households that consume non-alcoholic beverages
market are "online consumers" (i.e., consumers who did at least one time their purchases
online). In this market, the average share of expenditures for online consumers is high:
nearly 30%. It is the sector with one of the highest expenditure. Our paper contributes
to the literature on the effect of e-commerce on retail competition in the agro-food
industry. It is the first paper that studies the impact of the different strategies of
click & drive on retail competition and market expansion. Several papers examine
the effect on the price level, price dispersion, and market expansion. However, there
are no empirical studies about the impact of e-commerce on vertical relationships. Our
framework is in line with the literature on structural models of vertical relationships that
allow profit sharing between manufacturers and retailers. The methodology developed
is based on Draganska et al. (2010)1. In order to study the impact of e-commerce, we
use a counterfactual experiment method removing the online alternatives to analyze
the effect of the introduction of the online distribution channel on wholesale and retail
prices, manufacturer and retailer profits, and consumer surplus. E-commerce leads to
market expansion and an increase in consumer welfare. There is an increase in NB retail
prices. Consequently, the NB market share globally decreases. Inversely, a decrease in
PL retail prices for most retailers leads to the rise of the PL market shares. Thanks
to their bargaining ability, the manufacturers obtained higher wholesale prices with
the retailer who opened an online distribution channel, and then higher manufacturer
margins are higher with e-commerce. This increase of upstream margins allows most
manufacturers to obtain greater profits with e-commerce despite their market shares
1Draganska et al. (2010) develop a supply model to study the surplus division between
manufacturers and retailers in the German coffee market. They estimate the bargaining power of
firms assuming that retail and wholesale prices are determined simultaneously, which simplifies
the model’s computation. From this empirical framework, a growing literature use models of
vertical negotiations: Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Grennan (2013), Gowrisankaran et al.
(2015), Bonnet et al. (2020), and Ho and Lee among others.
5
decrease. With the hard discounter, which did not open online stores, the manufacturers
obtain lower wholesale prices and lower offline profits with e-commerce. The existence
of e-commerce permits manufacturers to obtain a higher share of total margins thanks
to the significant increase of the upstream margin. Moreover, the effect of e-commerce
on the retailer profits and the downstream margins depends on their strategy. The
retailers that have chosen an isolated strategy have higher margins, market shares, and
profits thanks to the online distribution channel’s existence. The isolated strategy allows
retailers to determine the right location and capture the flow of cars. Installing the
warehouse within the catchment area of the competitors permits cannibalizing them. It
can explain the increase of market shares of the retailers which choose the isolated
strategy. The retailers which followed an adjoined strategy get lower downstream
margins, market shares, and profits with e-commerce. Despite the loss of profits with
e-commerce, they decided to still open click & drive stores due to a strategic reaction to
the introduction of isolated click & drive stores. Indeed, the retailers with an adjoined
drive strategy obtain on average fewer market shares and profits if they do not open an
online distribution channel when competitors who follow an isolated strategy introduce
click & drive infrastructures than if they open online store. However, these differences
are not significant.
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the data in section 2. We
then present the demand and supply model in section 3. In section 4, we discuss the
model results, and we use our framework to simulate the impact of the e-commerce
introduction for both manufacturers and retailers. Finally, section 5 gives the main
conclusions of the paper.
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2 Data
We use a dataset of soft drink purchases in 2014 collected by the society KANTAR.
Those purchases are made by a French representative household panel. There is
information about the product characteristics, the date of the purchase, the price, the
retail chain where the panelist made their purchases, and household characteristics for
each purchase. The dataset also provides information on whether the purchase has
been made online or in-store and brand names of purchased items. There are 734,506
purchases where 7.51% were done online. The online market share represents 9.25% in
volume and 7.30% in value. About 87.40 % of the online purchases are done through
the click & drive. The set of brands includes private labels (PLs) and national brands
(NBs). The private labels denote products manufactured or packaged for sale under the
name of the retailer. In the French soft drink market, we assume that private labels
are either produced by a competitive fringe or by retailers themselves. Retailers sell
their PLs at marginal cost. 21.5% of the households who buy soft drinks are online
consumers. Moreover, the average share of expenditures for online consumers is high:
nearly 30%. It is one of the largest values of the average share of spending compared
to other food sectors. Consequently, it seems to be one of the most interesting markets
to study the impact of online grocery shopping. Five leading manufacturers operating
in the French soft drink market produced the NBs: the Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo,
Orangina-Schweppes, Eckes Granini, and Folliet. Soft drinks include colas, other sodas,
ice tea, and fruit juices. Each manufacturer produces several brands, and each brand
provides only one type of soft drink. We consider one PL per variety of soft drinks
and per retailer. Consumers can substitute the considered products with an alternative
product, the "outside option" which includes other secondary brands with a market
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share lower than 0.15% and the small retailers2. The outside good represents 24.07
percent of the market.
Table 1 depicts some descriptive statistics about prices and market shares per brand.
Retail prices of NBs are about twice more expensive than PLs. The average retail prices
of the purchased goods are globally lower online. An intensification of the competition
can explain it due to the possibility for the consumer to compare the online prices.
(Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Zettelmeyer et al. 2006). However, the computed prices
are the prices of the purchased goods and not of all the available goods. Moreover, we
computed a price for aggregation of several products that are marketed by this brand.
The number of alternatives is different online and offline: all the products are not all
available online and are not sold by all retailers. Consequently, lower prices can also
be the result of a different offer. The difference in online and offline prices does not
mean that the price is different for the same product online and offline. The prices
are generally the same online as in the store to which it is attached when there is an
attached store.
The PL represents a larger proportion of online sales than offline sales. 48.46 % of
the offline sales are PLs products, while 53.36 % of the online sales are PLs products.
It may be a consequence of the smallest choice variety over the representation of PLs
with an online distribution channel in the food industry. Furthermore, they are very
often favored there for visibility. For leading brands, the reality is different from a
physical store. Indeed, in hypermarkets, the strength of leading brands is to build a
vast range around their main format. In the click & drive concept, the notion of facing
2regional retailers, stores specialized in frozen food, butchers, bakeries, gas stations, regional
markets, small grocery stores
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for prices and market share per Brand










NB 1 Manufacturer 1 14.14 1.22 1.00 0.96
(0.65) (0.10) (0.29) (0.28)
NB 2 Manufacturer 2 1.04 0.12 0.73 0.75
(0.08) (0.03) (0.21) (0.23)
PL PL 1.94 0.19 0.46 0.41
(0.09) (0.03) (0.13) (0.12)
Total 17.13 1.53 0.92 0.87
(0.62) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26)
Soda
NB 3 Manufacturer 1 0.35 0.06 1.39 1.32
(0.13) (0.04) (0.41) (0.43)
NB 4 Manufacturer 1 0.93 0.07 0.96 0.91
(0.09) (0.02) (0.27) (0.29)
NB 5 Manufacturer 3 2.51 0.22 0.99 0.93
(0.26) (0.03) (0.29) (0.28)
NB 6 Manufacturer 3 1.57 0.14 1.14 1.11
(0.23) (0.03) (0.33) (0.33)
NB 7 Manufacturer 3 0.23 0.02 1.20 1.24
(0.12) (0.01) (0.37) (0.28)
NB 8 Manufacturer 3 0.43 0.02 1.26 0.78
(0.10) (0.01) (0.38) (0.47)
NB 9 Manufacturer 3 2.51 0.17 1.19 1.16
(0.33) (0.03) (0.34) (0.32)
NB 10 Manufacturer 2 0.50 0.04 0.80 0.78
(0.11) (0.01) (0.23) (0.25)
NB 11 Manufacturer 1 0.32 0.04 0.74 0.67
(0.04) (0.01) (0.21) (0.17)
NB 12 Manufacturer 3 0.30 0.02 1.34 1.31
(0.06) (0.01) (0.38) (0.32)
NB 13 Manufacturer 2 0.14 0.01 1.20 1.25
(0.03) (0.01) (0.31) (0.32)
PL PL 5.40 0.49 0.63 0.62
(0.55) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18)
Total 15.16 1.31 0.93 0.88
(1.45) (0.13) (0.26) (0.25)
Ice Tea
NB 14 Manufacturer 2 1.65 0.11 0.98 0.93
(0.17) (0.02) (0.28) (0.28)
NB 15 Manufacturer 1 0.24 0.02 0.87 0.84
(0.09) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18)
PL PL 1.32 0.11 0.71 0.69
(0.19) (0.02) (0.19) (0.19)
Total 3.21 0.24 0.86 0.81
(0.39) (0.04) (0.24) (0.22)
Juice
NB 16 Manufacturer 4 2.85 0.30 1.40 1.33
(0.30) (0.05) (0.43) (0.39)
NB 17 Manufacturer 3 0.28 0.03 2.36 2.06
(0.07) (0.01) (0.71) (0.67)
NB 18 Manufacturer 5 3.95 0.29 1.93 1.82
(0.19) (0.03) (0.52) (0.53)
PL PL 26.86 2.80 1.13 1.12
(1.23) (0.28) (0.33) (0.33)
Total 33.94 3.43 1.26 1.20
(1.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35)
Outside Option 24.07 (0.34)
Source: Kantar TNS Worldpanel, 2014. Market shares are in frequency of purchases and their standard deviations in
parenthesis refer to variation across periods. "PL" corresponds to private label. Retail prices for each row have been weighted
by market shares of brands, and their standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across retailers and periods.
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disappears, and all the references have the same number of pixels on the screen: an
essential reference has as much space as the product of a local speaker. The small
brands’ challenge of the click & drive is first to be present (Nielsen 2013).
Retailers are grocery store chains that differ by the size of their outlets and the
services they provide to consumers. Six leading retail groups (Auchan, Carrefour,
Casino, Les Mousquetaires, Système U and, Leclerc) and two german hard discounters
(Aldi and Lidl) operate in the French retail sector, which sold about 95 percent of
soft drink products. The most traditional distribution channel is the offline option,
where the consumers directly buy in-store. Additionally, it is possible to buy online.
The leading retailers opened an online distribution channel. They can adopt either
an isolated strategy or an adjoined strategy. Only retailers 2 and 6 globally adopt an
isolated strategy.3 Only the hard discounters, retailers 1 and 7, do not offer online
services. We assume that all the retailers are national chains and are present in all
regions in France. We suppose that consumers based in different regions face the same
assortment of products when shopping at a given retailer.
Table 2 shows heterogeneous market shares across retailers ranging from 0.69% to
19.25%. Retailers 2 and 6, the only retailers that adopt an isolated strategy, have an
online market share of respectively 1.83% and 3.01%, while the other retailers obtain
an online market share lower than 10%. There is also a potential explanation. The
isolated strategy makes it possible to determine the right location and capture the flow
of cars.
3In Appendix, Tables 11 provide the details of the kind of drive chosen by the main retailers.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for prices and market share per retailer
















Retailer 2 Isolated strategy
NBs 4.53 0.91 1.16 1.10
(0.21) (0.07) (0.36) (0.31)
PLs 3.86 0.92 1.07 1.00
(0.16) (0.11) (0.31) (0.30)
Total 8.38 1.83 1.12 1.05
(0.27) (0.15) (0.32) (0.30)
Retailer 3 Adjoined strategy
NBs 9.26 0.24 1.19 1.20
(0.33) (0.05) (0.35) (0.34)
PLs 7.88 0.20 1.07 1.04
(0.46) (0.05) (0.31) (0.32)
Total 17.14 0.44 1.13 1.13
(0.49) (0.09) (0.33) (0.32)
Retailer 4 Adjoined strategy
NBs 3.35 0.10 1.27 1.23
(0.16) (0.02) (0.36) (0.38)
PLs 4.52 0.10 1.06 1.10
(0.17) (0.03) (0.31) (0.37)
Total 7.87 0.19 1.15 1.18
(0.26) (0.03) (0.33) (0.37)
Retailer 5 Adjoined strategy
NBs 4.82 0.21 1.12 1.20
(0.59) (0.06) (0.33) (0.37)
PLs 5.29 0.23 0.92 0.98
(0.16) (0.05) (0.27) (0.29)
Total 10.10 0.45 1.05 1.14
(0.59) (0.10) (0.30) (0.34)
Retailer 6 Isolated strategy
NBs 7.30 1.23 1.16 1.07
(0.29) (0.09) (0.34) (0.31)
PLs 8.94 1.79 0.92 0.98
(0.38) (0.13) (0.27) (0.29)
Total 16.24 3.01 1.02 1.02








Retailer 8 Adjoined strategy
NBs 2.88 0.21 1.14 1.11
(0.20) (0.03) (0.33) (0.31)
PLs 4.05 0.36 1.00 0.98
(0.20) (0.06) (0.29) (0.29)
Total 6.93 0.58 1.06 1.03
(0.37) (0.09) (0.30) (0.28)
Outside Option 24.07 (0.34)
Source: Kantar TNS Worldpanel, 2014 Market shares are in frequency of purchases and their standard deviations in parenthesis
refer to variation across periods.
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For all the retailers except for the fourth one, the proportion of purchased PL is
higher online than offline.
3 Methodology
In this section, we model the French soft drink market using a structural model of
demand and supply. We first estimate the consumers’ preferences using a random
coefficient logit model. Consumers face a choice set composed of different soft drink
products, and each product is defined as the combination of a brand, a retailer, and a
distribution channel. Then, we model the retail competition that allows us to compute
retail margins. Afterward, we will estimate the profit sharing between retailers and
manufacturers using a Nash Bargaining game model. In order to estimate the effect of
the emergence of online distribution channels on prices, and manufacturer and retailer
profits, we remove the online stores and simulate new price equilibrium and market
shares.
3.1 The demand model: a random coefficient logit model
We use a random coefficient logit model to estimate the demand and the price
elasticities, as in Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001). This model gives flexible
substitution patterns for consumers. We assume that the whole set of soft drink products
the consumer faces can be defined by the distribution channel d, which is offline or
online, the retailer r among R retailers, and the brand b. A product j is then indexed
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where Jdr is the set of soft drink brands sold by the retailer r in the distribution channel
d.
Households h=1, ..., H are assumed to maximize an indirect utility function Uhjt of
buying the good j at the purchase occasion trip t:




where δdr(j) and δb(j) are time-invariant retailers distinguished by the distribution
channel and brand fixed effects, respectively. pjt is the price of good j in period t. αh is
the price disutility of the household. εhjt is the unobserved error term. We assume that
εjt = ξjt + e
h
jt where ξjt is a product-specific error term varying across periods and e
h
jt
is an individual specific error term.
We assume that αh could vary across households.
αh = α+ σvαh (3)
where α is the average price sensitivity4, vαi follows a normal distribution and represents
the deviation to the average price sensitivity, and σ measures the degree of heterogeneity.
4We also estimated demand with two distinct average price sensitivities, one for the online
purchases and one for offline purchase. The two coefficients and the elasticities are not
significantly different.
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We can divide the indirect utility into a mean utility Vjt = δdr(j) + δb(j)αpjt + ξjt
and a deviation from this mean utility µhjt = pjt(σαv
α
h ). The indirect utility is given by





The households can decide not to choose one of the considered products but a
substitute, the outside option. The utility of the outside good is normalized to zero.
The indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Uh0t = eh0t.
We assume that εhjt is independently and identically distributed like an extreme value
type I distribution. We are then able to write the individual probability for household


























where Ajt is the set of consumers buying the product j at time t and φ is the density
of the normal distribution.
















We also compute the variation of the market share of the distribution channel gd
when the prices of all products belonging to the distribution channel gd′ increase by 1%







































where ηgdjt represents the variation of the market share for the distribution channel
gd, when the price of the product j increases by 1% at the period t.
Identification and Estimation
We estimate the demand model using the simulated maximum likelihood method as
in Revelt and Train (1997). This method relies on the assumption that all product
characteristics are independent of the error term εhjt. However, the independence
assumption cannot hold if unobserved factors included in ξhjt such as promotions,
displays, and advertising are correlated with observed characteristics like the price.
In order to solve the problem that omitted product characteristics might be correlated
with prices and obtain consistent estimates of demand parameters, we use a two-stage
residual inclusion approach as in Petrin and Train (2010), and Terza et al. (2008).
We then regress prices on instrumental variables, as well as exogenous variables of the
demand equation:
pjt = Wjtψ + κb(j) + κdr(j) + ηjt (8)
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whereWjt is a vector of instrumental variables, ψ is the vector of associated parameters,
ηjt is an error term that captures the remaining unobserved variation in prices, and
κb(j)and κdr(j) are exogenous demand variables. The estimated error term η̂jt of the price
equation includes some omitted variables such as promotions, advertising variations, and
shelf displays that are not captured by the other exogenous variables of the demand
equation and by the instrumental variables that represent the cost of producing soft
drinks. Introducing η̂jt in the mean utility of consumers Vjt allows us to capture
unobserved product characteristics varying across time. Consequently, Prices are now
uncorrelated with the new product specific error term varying across periods the new
error term ζjt = ξjt − πη̂jt.
We then write:
Vjt = δdr(j) + δb(j) + αpjt + ζjt + πη̂jt (9)
where π is the parameter associated with the estimated error term of the first stage.
We use the price indexes for the main inputs used in the production of soft drinks.
Input prices are valid instruments since they explain prices. Moreover, the soft drink
industry only represents a very small share of the demand for those inputs, which
justifies the absence of a correlation between input prices and unobserved determinants
of the demand for soft drinks. We use the input price of sugar interacted by the quantity
of added sugar content of each brand, taking into the proportion of regular soft drinks
for each product in the other periods5. As we think that packaging material (can or
glass bottle) could affect both prices and demand of soft drinks, we use the input price of
5The proportion of regular soft drinks for each product in the other periods is independent
of the demand in the current period as we assume. The demand is independent across
periods(Hausman 1996), but it is a good proxy of the proportion of products for the sugar
as a cost shifter.
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aluminum interacted by the average percentage of can sold for each product in the other
periods. Similarly, we use the input price of glass interacted by the average percentage
of glass bottles sold for each product in the other periods. These indexes are provided by
the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We also use
BLP instruments as the number of competing products in the same soft drink category
within the retailer (Berry et al. 1995). Estimation results of the price equation are
presented in Table 12 in Appendix. We can see that the instruments are not weak since
the F-test is superior to 10.
3.2 Supply
The French soft drink industry is modeled, considering the vertical relationship between
the M manufacturers and R retailers. Let’s define Smt the set of products sold by
the manufacturer m at period t and Sdrt the set of products sold by the retailer r in
distribution channel d at time t.








Qt (wrbt − µbt) sdrbt(p) (10)






Qt (pdrbt − wrbt − cdrbt) sdrbt(p) (11)
where Qt is the market size, that is the total amount of quantity bought on the market
in period t, µbt is the marginal cost of production of brand b in period t, sdrbt is the
market share for a brand b sold by a retailer r in a distribution channel d in period t,
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wrbt is the wholesale price for brand b sold to a retailer r in period t. The distribution
channel are denoted as d = 1, 2 where d = 1 is the offline distribution channel and
d = 2 is the online distribution channel. pdrbt and cdrbt are respectively the retail price
and the constant marginal cost of distribution for brand b sold by a retailer r in the
distribution channel d in period t.
In many markets, as in the soft drink market, both the retailers and the
manufacturers have market power. Thus, we develop a bargaining game model as
follows.
Stage 1: manufacturers and retailers bargain simultaneously and bilaterally over linear
wholesale prices for each good. Wholesale contracts are secret for those who don’t
participate in the contract. We assume that negotiation on wholesale prices is modeled
as a Nash bargaining game.
Stage 2: retail prices are determined simultaneously by retailers competing on the
downstream market for final consumers.
We follow the method used in Draganska et al. (2010), and we assume that wholesale
and retail prices are determined simultaneously. We then turn to wholesale price
equilibrium, which results from the negotiation between manufacturers and retailers.
Stage 2: J resolution of retail price competition
We assume that there is Bertrand-Nash Competition between retailers, and they set
prices for each product. The retailer then maximizes its profit πrt . The first order









(pdrbt − wrbt − cdrbt)
∂sdrbt(p)
∂pdrkt
= 0 ∀kε Sdrt (12)
Using and solving this equation, the vector γrt of margins pdrbt − wrbt − cdrbt for the
retailer r can be written in the matrix form :
γrt(pt, θ̂, Irt) = −(IrtSptIrt)−1Irt st(pt) (13)
Irt is the JxJ ownership diagonal matrix with element 1 if product j is sold by the
retailer r and 0 otherwise, Spt is the JxJ matrix of the market shares derivatives with
respect to all retail prices with general element ∂sdrbt(p)∂pd′r′b′t in period t. st(pt) is the vector
of market shares.
Stage 1: J resolution bargaining between retailers and manufacturers
We assume that retailers and manufacturers have rational expectations. The wholesale
is determined independently of possible changes to retail price because the effect of the
outcome on the retail price is anticipated by both parties. Like in Draganska et al.
(2010), the manufacturers bargain with a given retailer for each of its goods, and each
good is negotiated independently with the manufacturer. Retail prices are assumed
to be fixed when manufacturers and retailers negotiate and are not observable at this
moment6.
The equilibrium wholesale price for brand b sold to retailer r is derived from the
bilateral bargaining problem between a manufacturer m that sold brand b and a retailer
r. The manufacturer and retailer pair maximizes the Nash product over the brand b:
6This is a strong assumption. We follow the literature (Draganska et al. 2010; Bonnet and
Bouamra-Mechemache 2020).
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(πrt − drt )λrm(πmt − dmt )1−λrm (14)
λrm is the exogenous bargaining weight of the retailer, and 1 − λrm is the exogenous
bargaining weight of the manufacturer. In other words, λrm represents the share of the
gain from trade going to the retailer for brand b produced by the manufacturer m. πrt



























nkt − µnkt) sdnkt (16)
drt and dmt are respectively the disagreement payoffs of the manufacturer m and of the
retailer r in period t. The manufacturer could obtain profit dmt from the sale of the
other alternatives than brand b to retailer r. The retailer can get drt if it drops the
manufacturer’s brand b from its stores but contracts with other brands. As we said















(w∗nkt − µnkt) Qts̃−rbdnkt (p) (18)
where s̃−rbd′r′b′(p) is the market shares of product k that occurs if brand b sold by
retailer r in both distribution channels is not offered.
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After rearranging term, it is equivalent to:
λrm(π
m
t − dmt )
∂πrt
∂wrbt




Replacing the profits and the disagreement payoffs by their value in the equations (15),








































IrtS̃∆tIrtγ(pt, θ̂, Irt)) = 0 (22)
where Imt is the (JxJ) ownership matrix of the manufacturer m with element 1 if
the product j (=drb) is sold by the manufacturer m and 0 otherwise at time t. The




is derived from equation (13). S̃∆t is a JxJ ownership matrix which is built as follows:
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S̃∆t =
 sdr′b′t if r’b’=rbsdr′b′t − s̃−rbdr′b′t otherwise
where s̃−rbdr′b′t is the market share of the brand b’ sold by retailer r’ in the distribution
channel d if brand b sold by retailer r is not offered. sdr′b′t is the market share for the
brand b’ sold by retailer r’ in the distribution channel d in period t when all products
are available.
Using the equation (22) for all brand b sold by a retailer r in distribution channel
d in period t, we obtain the matrix of the manufacturer margins:









∗ (IrtS̃∆tIrt)γ(pt, θ̂, Irt)] (23)
The vector of total margins is equal to
















where I is the (JxJ) identity matrix.
Identification
As in Draganska et al. (2010), we are not able to identify Γt(pt, Irt, Imt, θ/λ) because
we do not observe the bargaining power, λrm. As Cdrbt = pdrbt − γdrbt − Γdrbt, we use
restriction on the marginal cost function to identify λrm. We assume that Cdrbt has the
following specification:
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Cdrbt = cdrbt + µbt = Λωdrbt + ηdrbt (25)
where ωdrbt is a vector of cost shifters of the brand b in a distribution channel d and a
retailer r in period t, Λ is the vector of parameters associated, and ηdrbt the error term.
We use several cost sifters. In practice, we use the price indexes for the main inputs
used in the production of soft drinks, such as the input price of sugar interacted by the
quantity of added sugar content of each brand, taking into the proportion of light soft
drinks for each product in each period. Besides, we use the input price of aluminum
interacted by the average percentage of can sold for each product in each period, and the
input price of glass interacted by the average percentage of glass bottles sold for each
product in each period. These indexes are provided by the French National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies. To be consistent with economic theory, as in Gasmi
et al. (1992), we impose the positivity of the parameters sugar, glass, and aluminum
coefficients. Indeed, we assume that they all increase the overall marginal cost. We use
a non-linear least-squares method to estimate them. All the coefficients are significant
at 1%.
The final equation to be estimated is given by:
pt − γt(pt, θ̂, Irt) = Γt(pt, Irt, Imt, θ̂/λ̂) + Λωt + ηt (26)
Using non-linear least squared, we can estimate both Λ and λrm for each
retailer/manufacturer (rm) pair and thus to deduce the margin of the manufacturers
from the equation (23) 7.
7The identification of parameters (θ̂,λ̂rm) can be jeopardized by the presence of variables
like the retail prices or the predicted market shares of products in equation 24 that are likely to
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3.3 Counterfactual
We use the estimated parameters of the structural model (θ̂,λ̂rm) to analyze the impact
of the online distribution channel. To conduct such an experiment, we remove the online
distribution channel from markets and develop an algorithm that allows us to compute
new equilibrium prices. Then, we compute new price-cost margins, new market shares,
and the new firms’ profits. Finally, we compare two situations: the observed and the
counterfactual one.
Our algorithm consists in finding the Jpost dimensional vector of retail price p
post
t
that solves the following system of Jpost equations
(ppostt − (γt(p
post
t , θ̂, I
post






mt , θ̂/λ̂rm)) (27)
−(p∗t − (γt(p∗t , θ̂, I
post






mt , θ̂/λ̂rm))) = 0
where p∗t is the vector of equilibrium retail prices in period t from the baseline model.
Removing the online distribution channel alternatives, consumers have access to
fewer goods. The supply side of our model does not change, but the property matrices
change. Ipostmt is the (JpostxJpost) ownership matrix of the manufacturer m with element
1 if the product j(=drb) is produced by the manufacturer m and 0 otherwise at time
be correlated with the unobserved cost factors η. To solve this problem, we could use a GMM
estimator of the negotiation like in Gowrisankaran et al. (2015). However, we would need as
instruments as we have parameters so we should impose the following restriction λrm = λr+λm
or λrm = λm. We decide to follow Draganska et al. (2010) in order to take into account the
heterogeneity of λmr.
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t and Ipostrt is the (JpostxJpost) ownership matrix of the retailer r with element 1 if the
product j is sold by the retailer r and 0 otherwise at time t.
The equilibrium margins change because they depend on ppostt I
post
rt , and I
post
mt . We




In order to know if e-commerce is beneficial for the consumer, we compute the
variation of consumer surplus. In logit models, the consumer surplus is calculated as
the compensating variation necessary to restore consumers to the original level of utility.
The change in consumer welfare brought about by removing the online alternatives and
by changing prices from p∗t to p
post















In this section, we first present the results of the random coefficient logit model and thus
the consumer substitution patterns in the French soft drink market. Given the results
on price elasticity, we compute retail margins. Using exogenous cost variables, we then
estimate the exogenous bargaining power of retailers relative to manufacturers, which
allows us to compute manufacturer margins. Second, we discuss retail, manufacturer
and total margins, and bargaining power estimates. Finally, to assess the effect of
introducing the online distribution channel, we remove the online alternatives, and we
25
analyze the effect on prices, profits, and consumer surplus.
4.1 Demand Results
We estimated a random coefficient logit model on the whole sample of 684,010
observations using a simulated maximum likelihood method, and these results are
reported in Table 3. Households have heterogeneous price sensitivity with a standard
deviation of 0.23. For each retailer, the preference for the brick-and-mortar stores
is stronger than the online store as the offline coefficients are higher than the online
coefficients. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences for NB products and PL
categories.
Table 4 depicts the own and cross-price elasticities aggregated by distribution
channel. If the prices of all offline products increase by 1%, the demand for the
outside option increase by 5.11% (i.e. 1.25% point), the demand for the offline products
decreases by 2.30% (i.e. 1.59% point) and the demand for online products increases by
5.31% (i.e. 0.34% point). If the prices of all online products increase by 1%, the demand
of the outside option increase by 0.46% (i.e. 0.11% point on average), the demand of
the offline products increases by 0.48% (i.e. 0.33% point), and the demand for online
products decrease by 6.91% (i.e. 0.45% point). There is important substitutability from
the online to the offline distribution channel. However, from the offline distribution
channel to the online one, there is smaller substitutability.
Table 8 shows the own-price elasticities per distribution channel and brand. The
average own-price elasticities range between -2.99 and -6.91 for cola’s products, -4.17
and -9.73 for other sodas, -4.97 and -7.01 for ice tea products -7.75 and -12.65 for
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Alpha -6.48 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00)Brand fixed effects
Error of the price equation 6.65 (0.00) NB 1 -
NB 2 -4.35 (0.00)
Retailer fixed effects NB 3 -0.96 (0.00)
Brick and mortar stores NB 4 -3.14 (0.00)
Retailer 1 1.68 (0.00) NB 5 -1.61 (0.00)
Retailer 2 4.52 (0.00) NB 6 -1.12 (0.00)
Retailer 3 5.42 (0.00) NB 7 -2.64 (0.00)
Retailer 4 4.93 (0.00) NB 8 -2.12 (0.00)
Retailer 5 4.54 (0.00) NB 9 -0.47 (0.00)
Retailer 6 4.90 (0.00) NB 10 -4.86 (0.00)
Retailer 7 2.95 (0.00) NB 11 -5.77 (0.00)
Retailer 8 4.10 (0.00) NB 12 -1.54 (0.00)
NB 13 -3.24 (0.00)
Online stores NB 14 -2.46 (0.00)
Retailer 2 2.66 (0.00) NB 15 -4.95 (0.00)
Retailer 3 1.43 (0.00) NB 16 1.16 (0.00)
Retailer 4 1.23 (0.00) NB 17 5.40 (0.00)
Retailer 5 1.75 (0.00) NB 18 5.25 (0.00)
Retailer 6 2.80 (0.00) PL Colas -5.80 (0.00)
Retailer 8 1.39 (0.00) PL Sodas -3.74 (0.00)
PL Tea -4.39 (0.00)
PL Ice Juices 1.36 (0.00)
Number of Observations 684,010 LL -2,559,730
NB and PL respectively correspond to national brand and private label. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 4: Aggregated Elasticities
Elasticities*
Outside Option Offline Online
Offline 5.11 (0.09) -2.30 (0.09) 5.31 (0.10)
Online 0.46 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) -6.91 (0.10)
*The table should be read as follows: if the prices of all offline products
increase by 1%, the demand for online products would increase by 5.31%.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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juices. They are globally similar online and offline. These results do not follow the
current literature on e-commerce in the American food industry. Pozzi (2012) finds
that in-store own-price elasticities for the cereal market are about fifty percent higher
than online own-price elasticities and in-store cross-price elasticities are nearly three
times as large as online cross-price elasticities. In the same vein, Harris (2018) finds
that the own-price elasticities and cross-price elasticities are, on average, two and three
times larger in-store than they are online, respectively. However, Pozzi (2012) focuses
on mixed-channel households and Harris (2018) estimates the demand with a sample of
households. The own-price elasticities and estimated margins per retailer are given in
Table 7. The own-price elasticities are similar across the online and offline distribution
channels and the different retailers.
4.2 Bargaining power and price-cost margins
We compute the retail margins using equation (13) and the demand estimates. We then
estimate the parameters of equation (25) to obtain the exogenous bargaining power
parameters of each pair manufacturer/retailer and the cost shifters. Consequently, we
can compute the manufacturer margins.
The reported estimates of Table 5 are obtained through the estimation of the
bargaining model in equation (26). In this table, we only report the estimated cost.
We provide in Table 6 the bargaining power estimates. The retailers 2 and 6 which
follow an isolated strategy, are generally the ones with the greater bargaining power as
they have a greater λrm.
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Type of soft drink fixed effects Yes
Manufacturer fixed effects Yes
Parameters 1−λλ not shown
Number of Observations 3,406
***significant at 1%.
Table 6: Retailer-Manufacturer Estimates of Bargaining power λrm of the retailer
Manufacturer 1Manufacturer 2Manufacturer 3Manufacturer 4Manufacturer 5
Retailer 1 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.49 -
Retailer 2 0.58 0.48 0.67 0.54 0.53
Retailer 3 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48
Retailer 4 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.47 0.47
Retailer 5 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.48
Retailer 6 0.75 0.73 0.86 0.54 0.52
Retailer 7 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.47 0.53
Retailer 8 0.46 0.52 0.66 0.55 -
Table 7 depicts the estimated margins per retail group. Total price-cost margins are
generally not evenly split between upstream and downstream. As in Bonnet et al. (2020),
the manufacturer margins are often lower than the retailer margins. Globally, offline
and online margins are similar for the different retailers. Table 8 depicts the estimated
margins per brand. Most of the NBs obtain slightly lower manufacturer margins online
than in-sore except for the NBs 13 and 16. The offline and online downstream margins
are similar for the different NBs except for the NB 11, which gets lower downstream
margins in-store than online.
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Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online
Retailer 1 -6.75 - 5.92 - 17.35 - 23.27 -
(1.06) - (0.51) - (1.58) - (1.23) -
Retailer 2 -7.67 -7.44 6.84 7.00 15.39 16.69 22.23 23.69
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.45) (0.25) (0.58)
Retailer 3 -7.84 -7.67 7.76 7.97 16.88 17.71 24.63 25.67
(0.12) (0.44) (0.33) (0.52) (0.27) (0.57) (0.50) (0.93)
Retailer 4 -8.21 -7.97 9.54 8.72 14.99 15.22 24.54 23.94
(0.35) (0.58) (0.27) (0.41) (0.29) (1.34) (0.43) (1.18)
Retailer 5 -7.60 -7.74 7.98 7.50 16.31 15.88 24.29 23.38
(0.14) (0.42) (0.26) (0.34) (0.30) (0.79) (0.47) (0.75)
Retailer 6 -7.40 -7.03 3.64 3.82 18.37 18.61 22.02 22.43
(0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09) (0.29) (0.46) (0.35) (0.53)
Retailer 7 -7.49 - 6.75 - 17.92 - 24.67 -
(0.41) - (0.39) - (0.87) - (1.15) -
Retailer 8 -7.56 -7.33 7.41 7.24 15.48 15.93 22.89 23.16
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.33) (0.13) (0.56) (0.26) (0.80)
Average price-cost margins as a percentage of retail prices and average marginal costs are calculated using quantity weights.
Standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods.
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Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online
Colas
NB 1 Manufacturer 1 -6.91 -6.91 16.32 14.11 16.73 17.63 33.04 31.74
(0.15) (0.21) (0.32) (0.40) (0.38) (0.58) (0.69) (0.98)
NB 2 Manufacturer 2 -5.44 -5.39 19.84 17.9 21.84 22.4 41.68 40.31
(0.19) (0.33) (0.67) (0.92) (0.70) (1.12) (1.35) (1.95)
PL colas - -3.11 -2.99 - - 37.68 41.45 37.68 41.45
(0.09) (0.27) - - (1.17) (2.34) (1.17) (2.34)
Other sodas
NB 3 Manufacturer 1 -9.73 -9.46 11.32 9.51 12.12 12.68 23.44 22.19
(0.28) (0.25) (0.42) (0.43) (0.36) (0.45) (0.76) (0.80)
NB 4 Manufacturer 1 -6.95 -6.72 16.12 13.92 17.21 18.52 33.32 32.44
(0.17) (0.59) (0.49) (0.87) (0.33) (1.08) (0.76) (1.86)
NB 5 Manufacturer 3 -7.03 -7.04 13.93 8.96 17.10 18.27 31.03 27.23
(0.29) (0.49) (0.91) (0.70) (0.80) (0.74) (1.57) (1.32)
NB 6 Manufacturer 3 -8.11 -8.29 11.98 7.44 14.80 15.69 26.77 23.13
(0.23) (0.72) (0.63) (0.64) (0.42) (0.95) (0.94) (1.46)
NB 7 Manufacturer 3 -8.54 -8.59 11.3 7.69 14.02 14.49 25.32 22.18
(0.32) (0.50) (0.65) (4.35) (0.57) (1.30) (1.08) (3.20)
NB 8 Manufacturer 3 -8.93 -8.73 10.36 8.35 13.62 19.95 23.98 28.30
(0.68) (1.86) (0.99) (3.40) (1.04) (1.76) (1.97) (1.96)
NB 9 Manufacturer 3 -8.39 -8.37 11.53 7.03 14.23 15.15 25.76 22.18
(0.18) (0.40) (0.58) (0.32) (0.31) (0.54) (0.76) (0.50)
NB 10 Manufacturer 2 -5.69 -5.53 18.69 16.9 20.9 22.87 39.6 39.77
(0.15) (0.34) (0.56) (1.23) (0.53) (1.67) (1.05) (2.81)
NB 11 Manufacturer 1 -5.24 -4.74 21.31 19.72 22.60 26.20 43.90 45.91
(0.24) (0.30) (0.94) (0.87) (0.92) (1.54) (1.79) (2.29)
NB 12 Manufacturer 3 -9.43 -9.14 10.14 5.11 12.62 13.45 22.76 18.56
(0.20) (0.37) (0.53) (1.11) (0.29) (0.63) (0.71) (1.26)
NB 13 Manufacturer 2 -8.61 -8.31 12.35 13.10 14.16 14.10 26.51 27.20
(0.42) (0.70) (0.58) (1.66) (0.55) (2.05) (1.11) (3.69)
PL other sodas - -4.56 -4.17 - - 25.77 27.76 25.77 27.76
(0.22) (0.19) - - (1.09) (0.83) (1.09) (0.83)
Ice Tea
NB 14 Manufacturer 2 -7.01 -6.79 15.51 14.28 16.86 18.24 32.36 32.52
(0.24) (0.43) (0.44) (0.71) (0.51) (0.84) (0.94) (1.54)
NB 15 Manufacturer 2 -6.29 -5.66 17.57 14.38 19.34 21.43 36.91 35.81
(0.38) (0.54) (0.74) (1.45) (0.91) (1.86) (1.55) (2.89)
PL Ice Tea - -4.97 -5.22 - - 23.54 24.52 23.54 24.52
(0.07) (0.59) - - (0.32) (1.05) (0.32) (1.05)
Juices
NB 16 Manufacturer 4 -9.64 -9.49 10.98 11.41 12.03 12.79 23.01 24.21
(0.37) (0.52) (0.41) (0.56) (0.48) (0.67) (0.89) (1.22)
NB 17 Manufacturer 3 -14.83 -14.20 6.14 4.01 7.27 8.10 13.40 12.11
(0.48) (0.62) (0.34) (0.54) (0.36) (0.59) (0.69) (0.78)
NB 18 Manufacturer 5 -12.64 -12.65 8.30 7.66 8.95 9.44 17.26 17.1
(0.27) (0.34) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.34) (0.41) (0.57)
PL Juices - -7.75 -8.03 - - 14.70 15.05 14.70 15.05
(0.06) (0.21) - - (0.14) (0.44) (0.14) (0.44)
Average price-cost margins as a percentage of retail prices and average marginal costs are calculated using quantity weights. To
compare the online and offline margins, I did not take into account the hard discounters, which do not have an online
distribution channel. Standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods
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4.3 Counterfactual experiments
Finally, we remove the online products, compute a new bargaining equilibrium, and a
downstream price equilibrium for each product at each period. We estimate the effect
of the introduction of the online distribution channel on prices, profits, and consumer
surplus to first identify if e-commerce would lead to market expansion for retailers. As
the firms’ strategies may also be influenced by e-commerce and its potential market
expansion effect, we also analyze the impact of the emergence of e-commerce on vertical
relationships and particularly on profit sharing.
4.3.1 Impact of online distribution channel
Global effect on consumers and market
In order to know if e-commerce is beneficial for the consumer, we computed the consumer
surplus. With e-commerce, consumer surplus increases by 3.16% with a standard
deviation of 0.08 across periods. It is mainly due to the variety effect because when we
compute the variation of consumer surplus without estimating new prices strategies, we
find an increase of consumer surplus of 6.41 % and a standard deviation of 0.12 with e-
commerce. It shows that the global rise in retail prices in brick-and-mortar stores due to
e-commerce limits the increase in consumer surplus. Duch and Martens (2014) and Duch
et al. (2017) also find a greater consumer surplus with an online distribution channel.
We find a market expansion effect: the total share of the J alternatives is, on average,
0.95 percentage points greater with e-commerce with a standard deviation across periods
of 0.03. It is in line with the literature that also finds a positive impact of e-commerce
on the market expansion (Duch et al. 2017; Biyalogorsky and Naik 2003; Gallino and
Moreno 2014). The price reaction restricts this expansion. Without taking into account
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the new price strategy, the market expansion would be one average 1.63 percentage
point with a standard deviation across periods of 0.06. Tables 9 and 10 depicts the
difference in prices, margins, market shares, and profit with the introduction of e-
commerce. All the manufacturers and retailers obtain a lower profit through the offline
distribution channel with e-commerce. It shows that online sales have cannibalized a
part of traditional retail sales.
Effect on retail prices
When we do not estimate a new price strategy without e-commerce, the market shares
of most of the manufacturers and the PLs increase with e-commerce (Table 14 in
Appendix). Considering strategic price reaction, the offline retail prices of NB products
increase for the retailer. The offline retail prices of PL products are globally stable
with e-commerce. More precisely, the PL retail prices decrease with e-commerce except
for the two retailers, which open an online distribution channel following an isolated
strategy (Table 15). Consequently, the NB share decreases and the PL share increases
with e-commerce (Tables 9).
Effect on wholesale prices
The effect of the introduction of e-commerce on offline wholesale prices depends if the
retailers open or not an online distribution channel. For the hard discounters that
did not develop any online distribution channel, the offline wholesale price and the
offline upstream margins and profits are lower with e-commerce. For the retailer which
opened an online distribution channel, the wholesale price, and consequently, the offline
upstream margins are higher with e-commerce. The total manufacturer profits globally
increased with e-commerce. The loss in market shares due to the higher share of PLs
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online is compensated by increased margins when the online distribution channel is
introduced. Only manufacturer 5 obtained a lower profit with the presence of an online
distribution channel. Moreover, e-commerce permitted manufacturers to get a higher
share of total margin thanks to the important increase of upstream margin.
Heterogeneous effect on retail prices across click & drive stategies
The impact of e-commerce on offline retail prices and market shares depends on retailers’
click drive strategy. First, Table 14 in Appendix shows that, when we do not consider
strategic price reaction, the market shares of the hard discounters (i.e., the retailer 1 and
7) decrease, respectively, by 0.48 and 0.15 percentage point with e-commerce. Table 10
shows that taking into account the price reaction, the new retail price equilibrium, the
retail prices decrease with e-commerce by about 0.04% and 0.05%, limiting the previous
decrease of market share. Consequently, with e-commerce, the hard discounters obtain
a market share decrease of only 0.03 and 0.08 percentage points. For the retailers that
followed an isolated strategy (i.e. retailers 2 and 6), the market shares increase by,
respectively, 1.24 and 1.86 percentage points with e-commerce and without strategic
price reaction. However, an increase in retail prices by about 1% limits the increase of
market shares with e-commerce. With e-commerce, retailers 2 and 6 obtain a market
share increase of 0.54 and 1.29 percentage points. The retailers which followed an
adjoined strategy have different reactions. Without the strategic price reaction, one
of them, retailer 8, obtain a market share increase of 0.07 percentage point with e-
commerce. An increase in their retail prices by 0.50% leads to a decrease in market
shares of 0.01 percentage point. For the other retailers that followed an adjoined
strategy, the retailers 3, 4, and 5, the market shares decrease by respectively 0.75, 0.34,
and 0.26 percentage points without considering the price reaction. When we simulate
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the new prices without e-commerce, retail prices increase with e-commerce, limiting the
decrease in market share. Finally, with e-commerce, the market shares of the retailers
3, 4, and 5 decrease by, respectively, 0.37, 0.22, and 0.17 percentage points.
Heterogeneous effect on retail margins and profits across click & drive
strategies
The effect of the online distribution channel on downstream margins also depends on the
click & drive strategy of the retail groups. Table 10 shows that, for the retailers which
do not open an online distribution channel, the hard discounters, the retail prices, and
the wholesale prices decrease with e-commerce. For the hard discounters, the decrease
in wholesale prices is smaller than the decline in the retail price, so it leads to a decrease
in downstream margins. Hard discounters lose market shares and downstream margins
from the introduction of online services in traditional retailers as they do not offer
them. However, hard discounters gain from the profit-sharing with the manufacturers
because of a decrease in upstream margins larger than the decrease in downstream
margins with e-commerce. The downstream margins increase for the retailer with an
isolated strategy thanks to an important increase in the retail price superior to the rise
in wholesale prices. The increase in downstream margins and market shares leads to
greater total profits with e-commerce for retailers 2 and 6 that followed an isolated
strategy. The downstream margins decrease for the retailers with an adjoined strategy.
The increase in retail price is not sufficient to compensate for the rise in wholesale price.
The retailers with an adjoined strategy obtained fewer profits with e-commerce, thanks
to the lower market shares and downstream margins.
To summarize, the hard discounters and the retailers who mainly adopt an adjoined
35














Manufacturer 1 1.06 (0.03) 0.27 (0.01) 8.39 (0.08) -275.00 (17.40)
Manufacturer 2 0.86 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 8.70 (0.19) -137.89 (8.33)
Manufacturer 3 0.46 (0.05) 0.34 (0.06) 8.93 (0.56) -84.02 (14.54)
Manufacturer 4 0.91 (0.02) 0.25 (0.01) 9.18 (0.15) -48.57 (2.98)
Manufacturer 5 0.37 (0.01) 0.35 (0.05) 3.72 (2.26) -2.34 (0.27)












Manufacturer 1 -0.44 (0.03) 235.55 (19.77) 3.39 (4.35)
Manufacturer 2 -0.25 (0.01) 99.47 (9.49) 3.97 (4.14)
Manufacturer 3 0.01 (0.03) 69.65 (17.57) 4.52 (5.30)
Manufacturer 4 -0.13 (0.00) 55.94 (4.21) 4.25 (4.12)
Manufacturer 5 -0.01 (0.00) -0.26 (1.28) 2.34 (3.53)
PL 1.77 (0.02) - -
Changes in offline retail prices and margins for each row have been weighted by market shares. It is the variation between the
offline simulated prices or margins and counterfactual prices or margins. It must be read as: with e-commerce, the offline retail
prices of manufacturer 1 increase on average by 1.06% point. The change in offline profit is the variation in percent between the
offline simulated profit and the counterfactual profit. The standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods.
strategy obtained lower market shares with e-commerce. The retailers which adopt an
isolated approach obtained higher market shares.
4.3.2 Variation of wholesale prices and bargaining ability
To understand the variation of the wholesale price, we study the bargaining outcome
between the retailers and the manufacturers. Solving the bargaining power in equation
(14) leads to the following first-order condition.
λrm(π
m
t − dmt )
∂πrt
∂wrbt




The first source of bargaining power is captured by the terms πmdrbt−dmdrbt and πrdrbt−drdrbt
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Retailer 1 -0.04 (0.00) -0.05 (0.00) -0.20 (0.02) -9.70 (0.80)
Retailer 2 1.33 (0.03) 0.61 (0.01) 10.36 (0.26) -507.13 (42.34)
Retailer 3 0.08 (0.01) -0.49 (0.03) 1.03 (0.06) -404.36 (33.59)
Retailer 4 0.15 (0.01) -0.26 (0.01) 1.00 (0.06) -180.77 (12.71)
Retailer 5 0.26 (0.02) -0.22 (0.01) 1.85 (0.10) -263.64 (22.42)
Retailer 6 0.82 (0.02) 1.59 (0.03) 8.51 (0.20) -649.25 (48.55)
Retailer 7 -0.05 (0.00) -0.10 (0.00) -0.21 (0.01) -29.87 (2.82)











Retailer 1 -0.03 (0.00) -9.70 (0.80) 0.16 (0.23)
Retailer 2 0.54 (0.01) 243.90 (18.82) -6.51 (3.48)
Retailer 3 -0.37 (0.02) -206.06 (17.35) -0.92 (0.60)
Retailer 4 -0.22 (0.01) -96.58 (7.98) -1.09 (0.68)
Retailer 5 -0.17 (0.01) -81.57 (7.42) -1.50 (0.92)
Retailer 6 1.29 (0.02) 714.32 (57.96) -2.94 (2.47)
Retailer 7 -0.08 (0.00) -29.87 (2.82) 0.10 (0.11)
Retailer 8 -0.01 (0.01) -5.10 (2.79) -2.62 (1.58)
Changes in offline retail prices and margins for each row have been weighted by market shares. It is the variation between the
counterfactual prices or margins and the offline simulated prices or margins. It must be read as follow: with e-commerce, the
offline retail prices of retailer 1 decrease on average by 0.04 % point. The change in offline profit is the variation in percent
between the counterfactual profit and the offline simulated profit. The standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation
across periods.
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which represent respectively the incremental gains from trade obtained by manufacturer
f and retailer r given that all other bilateral contracts are formed. The higher a firm’s
incremental gains from trade, the larger its losses from not reaching an agreement, which
strengthens the bargaining power of its trading partner. The second source of bargaining









are embedded in which respectively refer to the cost incurred by manufacturer f and
retailer r from making a price concession to its trading partner during negotiations.
Hence, a manufacturer or a retailer with a high concession cost is less willing to provide
more favorable trading terms to his trading partner. However, with our framework, the
















These ratios can be related to the concept of "fear of ruin" (Aumann and Kurz 1977).
They measure a firm’s fear of risking a bargaining breakdown compared to accepting
a concession to its trading partner. Based on this concept, Svejnar (1986) develops a
bargaining model in which the firm with a greater fear of bargaining breakdown relative
to its bargaining ability must make a price concession to its trading partner: e.g.,
retailer r makes a price concession to manufacturer f for the brand b, sold by retailer r
8In our framework, the retail and wholesale prices are determined simultaneously and the








= −1. In Bonnet et al. (2020), they also focus on the
French soft drink market, and they develop a sequential model allowing for wholesale prices to
affect retailers’ final price decisions. In this paper, the ratio of concession cost is about -0.5.
Consequently, changing our framework would not change the sign of the ratio of concession
cost.
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He shows that the unique solution to this bargaining process is obtained when firms
perceive the same fear of bargaining breakdown relative to their bargaining ability,
which is precisely the equality of ratios equation (29). We compute these two ratios
removing the online alternatives without estimating a new price equilibrium. Table 16
in Appendix shows that only the hard discounters, the retailers 1 and 7, generally make
a price concession when we delete the online distribution channel without estimating
new prices. The manufacturers make a price concession to the other retailers with
e-commerce and without a price adjustment. It may explain that, with e-commerce,
wholesale prices decrease for the hard discounters and increase for the retailers who
opened an online distribution channel with e-commerce.
4.3.3 Variation of retailer profit and choice of strategy
From 2000 to 2008, only isolated Click & Drives of the Retailers 2 and 6 were present in
France. The other retailers progressively opened Click & Drive distribution channels in
France from 2009. The retailers which choose an adjoined strategy obtain fewer profits
with e-commerce than without e-commerce. We want to understand why they open and
keep an online distribution channel if they do not get more profit with e-commerce. We
simulated another counterfactual where we remove the online alternative only for the
retailers which choose an adjoined strategy. Figure 1 shows that profit-sharing between
the manufacturers and the retailers is relatively stable across the different scenarios. We
find that the retailers which choose an isolated strategy obtain larger market shares and
profits when they are the only ones to have an online distribution channel. The retailers
which choose an adjoined strategy get on average lower market shares and profits when
only the retailers which choose an isolated strategy have an online distribution channel
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than when they also open an online distribution channel. However, this difference is
not significant.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the impact of online grocery shopping on the French soft drink
markets. We developed a structural demand and supply model that allows us to take
into consideration the heterogeneity in consumer preferences and the division of surplus
in the vertical chain. A simulation method allowed us to see the impact of online grocery
shopping on consumers’ and firms’ surplus and the profit-sharing between retailers and
manufacturers. The first objective of this work is to identify the effect of the adjoined
and isolated strategies on prices, profits, and consumer surplus. We find that, despite a
price increase of NBs, the consumer surplus increases with e-commerce. The online
distribution channel reduces sales from the offline distribution channel, but at the
same time, e-commerce creates a market expansion effect. The effect of e-commerce
on retailers’ profits and margins depends on their strategy. The retailers which have
chosen an isolated strategy get higher market shares, downstream margins, and profits
thanks to the existence of the online distribution channel. The retailers which followed
an adjoined strategy obtain lower downstream margins, market shares, and profits with
e-commerce. From 2000 to 2008, only the retail groups 2 and 6 that follow in the
majority the isolated strategy open Click & Drive stores in France. The other retailers
progressively opened Click & Drive distribution channels in France from 2009. We
find that the retailers which choose an adjoined strategy obtain lower market shares
and profits if only the retailers that mainly open isolated click & drive stores open an
40
Figure 1: Profits Sharing
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online distribution channel than with e-commerce. However, these differences are not
significant.
The second objective of this work is to analyze the impact of the emergence of e-
commerce on the vertical relationship. Several papers study the effect on the price level,
price dispersion, and market expansion. However, there are no empirical studies about
the impact of e-commerce on vertical relationships. We show that e-commerce leads to
higher upstream margins and profits for the majority of manufacturers. The variation
of the wholesale price is explained by the firms’ fear of making a breakdown compare to
accepting a concession to its trading partner. Indeed, we found that the fear of risking a
breakdown is lower for the hard discounters than for the manufacturers, explaining the
decline in wholesale prices. On the contrary, this fear is higher for the other retailers,
explaining the increase in wholesale prices.
With the emergence of the internet, online grocery shopping expands in Europe,
especially in the UK and France. This project is of great contemporary academic
significance to understand how the growing distribution channel affects the agro-food
chain.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Types of E-commerce and Choices of Retailers
There are three types of e-commerce in the food industry: the orders with delivery, the
Click & Collect, where the consumers buy online and then pick up their order prepared
in the store. Finally, the most used strategy in France is Click & drive, where the
consumers buy online and then pick up the order by car.
There are two kind of Click & drive: the isolated drive with an autonomous and
remote warehouse and the adjoined drive with a dedicated warehouse but attached
to a classic store. It exists two types of adjoined click & drive stores. The location
is adjacent to a store for the adjoined parking drive but supplies itself and operates
autonomously. The employee does not shop in-store itself but in the warehouse. For
the adjoined picking drive, the employee shops in the same store to satisfy the order.
The customer will pick up his/her order in a space dedicated to the click & drive store.
Table 11 shows the kind of click & drive store chosen by the leading retailers. The
groups do not have the same strategy. Retailers 2 and 6 resorted to drives mostly
isolated, unlike other groups.
Table 11: Types of Drives Strategy and Retailers’ Choices
Group Adjoined picking Drive Adjoined parking Drive Isolated Drive Total
Retailer 2 5 (2.7%) 73 (39.7%) 106 (57.6%) 184 (100%)
Retailer 3 390 (89 ,9%) 10 (2.3%) 34 (7.8%) 434 (100%)
Retailer 4 284 (95,6%) 0 (0%) 13 (4.4%) 297 (100%)
Retailer 5 609 (99.3%) 1 (0.2%) 3 (0.5%) 613 (100%)
Retailer 6 58 (10.5%) 181 (32.8%) 312 (56.6%) 551 (100%)
Retailer 8 331 (97.3%) 4 (1.2%) 5 (1.5%) 340 (100%)
Source: Nielsen TradeDimensions, 2014
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6.2 Control Function
Table 12: Control Function
Price (Euro/Liter) Value Standard error
Sugar Cost 100ml Month 0.0001*** 0.0000
Product number per category and period -0.0318*** 0.0034
Cost Aluminium Month 0.0062*** 0.0007
Cost Glass Month 0.0227*** 0.0010
Retailer fixed effect Yes
Brand fixed effect Yes
F-statistic 4272.91
Probability > F 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.9804
Number of observations 3,331
***indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 13: Correlation between the BLP instruments
Sugar Cost 100ml Product numberper category and period Aluminium Cost Glass Cost
Sugar Cost 100ml 1.0000
Product number per
category and period 0.0065 1.0000
Aluminium Cost -0.0451 0.0009 1.0000
Glass Cost 0.1374 0.1187 -0.0232 1.0000
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manufacturer profits (k euros)
Change in manufacturer
profit sharing (% point)
Manufacturer 1 0.371* (0.022) 525.509 (39.87) 3.729 (4.354)
Manufacturer 2 0.154 (0.014) 254.716 (21.256) 4.158 (4.017)
Manufacturer 3 0.189 (0.042) 97.587 (25.487) 4.459 (5.047)
Manufacturer 4 0.065 (0.006) 120.839 (8.591) 4.277 (3.886)
Manufacturer 5 -0.004 (0.003) 0.300 (2.522) 2.203 (3.325)
PL 0.856 (0.044) - -
Change in
market shares (% point)
Change in
retailer profits (k euros)
Change in retailer
profit sharing (% point)
Retailer 1 -0.048 (0.003) -17.982 (1.454) -0.02 (0.028)
Retailer 2 1.244 (0.026) 559.867 (45.544) -6.353 (3.433)
Retailer 3 -0.751 (0.049) -417.923 (34.01) -1.220 (0.755)
Retailer 4 -0.340 (0.013) -151.131 (11.519) -1.271 (0.788)
Retailer 5 -0.260 (0.017) -121.682 (8.849) -1.642 (1.017)
Retailer 6 1.864 (0.030) 1024.738 (81.281) -2.893 (2.512)
Retailer 7 -0.146 (0.005) -56.416 (5.457) -0.059 (0.050)
Retailer 8 0.069 (0.012) 28.515 (5.605) -2.721 (1.665)
The standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods. The change in offline profit is the variation in percent
between the counterfactual profit without adjustment of prices and the offline simulated profit. *It must be read as follow: with
e-commerce and without adjustment of prices strategy, the market share of manufacturer 1 increases on average by 0.371%.
6.3 Change with e-commerce
Table 15: Changes in offline retail prices with e-commerce
Change in retail price (%)
NB PL
Retailer 1 -0,11 (0.01) -0,01 (0.00)
Retailer 2 2,60 (0.05) 0,09 (0.00)
Retailer 3 0,25 (0.02) -0,09 (0.01)
Retailer 4 0,36 (0.02) -0,04 (0.00)
Retailer 5 0,57 (0.03) -0,04 (0.00)
Retailer 6 1,32 (0.02) 0,32 (0.01)
Retailer 7 -0,09 (0.01) -0,02 (0.00)
Retailer 8 1,05 (0.03) -0,01 (0.00)
The standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods.
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Table 16: Difference between the retailers and the manufacturers ratios
Manufacturer 1 Manufacturer 2 Manufacturer 3 Manufacturer 4 Manufacturer 5
Retailer 1 0.0061 (0.0002) 0.0031 (0.0003) 0.0017 (0.0002) 0.0013 (0.0000) -
Retailer 2 -0.0669 (0.0006) -0.0718 (0.0025) -0.0501 (0.0018) -0.0630 (0.008) -0.0442 (0.0043)
Retailer 3 -0.0050 (0.0003) -0.0076 (0.0004) -0.0081 (0.0006) -0.0089 (0.0004) -0.0022 (0.0026)
Retailer 4 -0.0064 (0.0003) -0.0097 (0.0015) -0.0058 (0.0015) -0.0097 (0.0008) -0.0008 (0.0001)
Retailer 5 -0.0107 (0.0004) -0.0125 (0.0010) -0.0125 (0.0017) -0.0146 (0.0006) -0.0047 (0.0078)
Retailer 6 -0.0443 (0.0003) -0.0373 (0.0006) -0.0377 (0.0019) -0.0498 (0.0015) -0.0037 (0.0206)
Retailer 7 0.0057 (0.0002) 0.0033 (0.0002) 0.0016 (0.0002) 0.0011 (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.0000)
Retailer 8 -0.0253 (0.0008) -0.0220 (0.0025) -0.0163 (0.0006) -0.0231 (0.0015) -













The standard deviations in parenthesis refer to variation across periods.
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